By Yang Zhen

楊震

Security has increasingly become a core issue in international politics since the Ukraine crisis and the issue of nuclear security has risen to a new height since the Cold War.

烏克蘭危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來，安全問題日益成為國(guó)際政治中的核心議題，尤其是核安全問題已上升到冷戰(zhàn)之后的新高度。

Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin chaired a permanent conference on nuclear deterrence, an annual event within the framework of the Security Council of Russia. The meeting primarily focused on updating the foundations of the country's nuclear deterrence policy. According to Putin, Russia has always been highly responsible in matters like nuclear weapons, striving to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and their components. Russia's nuclear triad remains the most important security guarantee for Russia and an instrument for maintaining balance of forces in the world. In the updated version of Russia's nuclear doctrine, Russia expanded the scope of states and military alliances subject to nuclear deterrence measures. Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear-weapon state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear-weapon state, is considered as a joint attack on Russia. Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of such aggression. Furthermore, if conventional weapons pose a serious threat to Russia's sovereignty, it will also be grounds for a nuclear response. Russia also reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Belarus as a member of the Union State.

近日，俄羅斯總統(tǒng)普京主持召開核威懾問題常設(shè)會(huì)議，這是俄羅斯聯(lián)邦安全會(huì)議框架內(nèi)的年度例會(huì)。此次會(huì)議主要討論了核遏制國(guó)家政策基礎(chǔ)的更新。普京表示“俄羅斯以最高程度的責(zé)任感對(duì)待核武器問題，將致力于避免核武器及其相關(guān)構(gòu)件的泛濫。‘三位一體’的核力量仍是俄羅斯安全的最重要保障和保證全球平衡的工具?！痹诟掳娴亩砹_斯核學(xué)說中，俄方擴(kuò)大了將對(duì)其采取核威懾措施的國(guó)家和軍事同盟的范圍：無核國(guó)家在有核國(guó)家的參與或者支持下，針對(duì)俄羅斯的侵略將被視為這兩者的聯(lián)合攻擊，俄方將以核武器進(jìn)行回應(yīng)。此外，當(dāng)常規(guī)武器對(duì)俄羅斯主權(quán)造成嚴(yán)重威脅時(shí)，也將成為俄方作出“核回應(yīng)”的理由。俄方還保留在白俄羅斯作為俄白聯(lián)盟成員遭到入侵時(shí)使用核武器的權(quán)利。

Russia's actions are not isolated as NATO has also been active in the nuclear field. Recently, the Atlantic Council, a well-known think tank, called for NATO to adapt its nuclear sharing program, suggesting the deployment of B-61 nuclear bombs to Eastern Europe and the establishment of a network of intermediate-range missile bases across Europe. The think tank praised Washington's decision to send Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles to Germany as a "good start," and insisted that it "does not impose a high enough price" on Russia.

俄羅斯此舉并非孤立，北約在核領(lǐng)域也動(dòng)作頻頻。不久前，著名智庫(kù)大西洋理事會(huì)呼吁“北約必須調(diào)整其核共享計(jì)劃”，建議將B－61原子彈運(yùn)往東歐，并在整個(gè)歐洲建立中程導(dǎo)彈基地網(wǎng)絡(luò)。該智庫(kù)稱贊華盛頓向德國(guó)運(yùn)送戰(zhàn)斧和SM－6導(dǎo)彈的決定是一個(gè)“良好的開端”，但認(rèn)為此舉“沒有向俄羅斯施加足夠的壓力”。

The US had deployed hundreds of new nuclear bombs at several air bases in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Türkiye as of last year. There are also reports that the US plans to redeploy nuclear weapons in the UK after a 15-year hiatus. Additionally, the topic of "extended deterrence" was discussed for the first time during the "2+2" talks between the foreign and defense ministers of Japan and the US this year. The US pledged to use military force, including nuclear weapons, to protect its allies.

截至去年，美國(guó)已在德國(guó)、荷蘭、比利時(shí)、意大利和土耳其的多個(gè)空軍基地部署了上百枚新型核彈。還有消息稱，美國(guó)正計(jì)劃在時(shí)隔15年后重新在英國(guó)部署核武器。此外，日本和美國(guó)今年舉行的外交部長(zhǎng)和國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)“2＋2”會(huì)談上，首次討論“延伸威懾”：美國(guó)承諾使用包括核武器在內(nèi)的軍事力量保護(hù)盟國(guó)的問題。

The confrontation between Russia and NATO on nuclear security is bound to have serious consequences in the security field.

俄羅斯和北約在核安全問題上的對(duì)抗注定在安全領(lǐng)域造成嚴(yán)重影響。

First, it will worsen the global security environment. As the large holders of nuclear arsenals, Russia and NATO are essentially in a spiral of confrontation. Given the high intensity of previous conflicts, there is now little room for compromise between the two sides.

首先，將惡化全球安全環(huán)境。作為最大的核武裝擁有者，俄羅斯和北約實(shí)際上已陷入螺旋式對(duì)抗軌道，且由于前期對(duì)抗強(qiáng)度太大，雙方的妥協(xié)余地已很小。

Second, it will change the nature of nuclear weapons. Currently, the world is in the intermediate to advanced stages of informationized warfare. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and big data are being increasingly applied to military fields. In particular, AI has significantly altered the face of warfare. The confrontation between the US and Russia in the nuclear field will likely lead to the application of emerging military technologies to nuclear weapons and fundamentally change its nature.

其次，核武器本身將會(huì)發(fā)生變化。當(dāng)前正處于信息化戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的中高級(jí)階段。人工智能、大數(shù)據(jù)等新興技術(shù)逐漸被廣泛運(yùn)用于軍事領(lǐng)域。特別是人工智能技術(shù)，很大程度上改變了戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的面貌。而美俄在核領(lǐng)域的對(duì)抗將導(dǎo)致新興軍事技術(shù)運(yùn)用于核武器，改變核武器的性質(zhì)。

Third, it will further deteriorate the international nuclear arms control system. In recent years, the arms control mechanisms established during the Cold War have been continuously undermined. After the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Russia announced in February 2023 that it would suspend its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the US, halting the sharing of nuclear weapon information. The US subsequently announced it would stop exchanging nuclear data with Russia as well. With the US and Russia holding over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, their repeated breaches of agreements put the mutual supervision and transparency mechanisms in the nuclear arms control field at risk of collapse, which severely impacts the international arms control framework. The ongoing "nuclear confrontation" between the two will further damage this system.

最后，國(guó)際核軍控體系面臨更大破壞。近年來，冷戰(zhàn)期間建立的核軍控機(jī)制不斷遭到破壞。繼美國(guó)退出《反導(dǎo)條約》和《中導(dǎo)條約》之后，俄羅斯于2023年2月宣布暫停履行與美國(guó)簽署的《新削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》，停止與其分享核武器的相關(guān)信息。美國(guó)隨后也宣布停止與俄羅斯交換核武器數(shù)據(jù)。擁有全世界90％以上核武器的美俄不斷“失約”，使雙方在核軍控領(lǐng)域的相互監(jiān)督和透明機(jī)制面臨崩潰的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，進(jìn)而嚴(yán)重沖擊國(guó)際核軍控體系。而未來雙方在“核對(duì)抗”過程中將使該體系遭受更嚴(yán)重的破壞。

(The author is deputy director of the Center for Northeast Asian Studies at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law.)

 (作者為上海政法學(xué)院東北亞研究中心副主任) 

Editor's note: Originally published on china.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.